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Transpersonal psychology has at times critiqued the broader psychology field 
for perpetrating a somewhat arbitrary Cartesian subject-object divide. Some 
phenomenologists claim that reframing this purported divide as an experienced 
phenomenon can defuse its philosophical impact. If subjective experiences are 
viewed as continuous with the lifeworld out of which objective phenomena are 
abstracted, the divide between these is revealed as a somewhat arbitrary, if useful, 
construction. This, in turn, challenges psychology to engage with subjective 
phenomena in a more substantive way. In this paper based on excerpts from a 
protracted email conversation held on the American Psychological Association’s 
Humanistic Psychology (Division 32) listserv, two academic psychologists with 
transpersonal interests explore this extraordinary claim of phenomenology, one 
being a proponent and the other being a skeptic of the claim. Two other academic 
psychologists with transpersonal interests who participated in this dialogue 
comment on its relevance for transpersonal psychology. The conversation focuses 
on the ideas of Husserl and Heidegger, and emphasizes how phenomenology 
might reconcile the subject-object divide through exploring intentionality, the 
meaning of noetic/noema, and thinking itself, while the discussion serves as an 
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The listserv for the Society of Humanistic Psychology (also known as the American Psychological Association Humanistic 
Psychology Division 32) had a history of producing 
protracted, often intense, dialogues at the 
intersection of complex issues within psychology 
and related fields, such as philosophy. One of 
these previous conversations (Franco, Friedman, 
& Arons, 2008) was reformatted for academic 
publication because of the depth of its examination 
of the qualitative-quantitative methodological 
divide within humanistic research. This allowed for 
differing views to be aired back-and-forth as a type 
of adversarial collaboration, providing opportunities 
for generating common ground among the 
participants and observers of these conversations. 
Another one of these “epic” collaborations on 
the same listserv occurred between Brent Dean 
Robbins (B. D. R.) and Harris L. Friedman (H. L. F.), 
with Chad V. Johnson (C. V. J.) and Zeno Franco 
(Z. F.) participating (along with lesser involvement 
by some others) during the years 2009 and 2010). 
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It focused on the claim that phenomenology can 
reconcile the dualism involving the Cartesian subject-
object divide, which could be of great interest to 
many transpersonal scholars not familiar with the 
complex approach of phenomenology in this area. 
Over these two years, we explored the claim made 
by Husserl and Heidegger that phenomenology is 
foundational to all scientific endeavors, and that it 
can transcend the troubling subject-object dualism 
found in post-positivistic science. This position 
that it does this successfully is championed by B. 
D. R., but is challenged by H. L. F. in a series of 
deep interchanges. Although heavily edited with 
many deletions for brevity, many of B. D. R. and H. 
L. F.’s interchanges are captured verbatim, providing 
a vivid glimpse of a sincere yet agonistic dialogue 
(Tannen, 2002) in which two seasoned academic 
psychologists with transpersonal interests debated 
and argued their way to a deeper understanding. C. 
V. J. and Z. F., primarily in observer roles throughout 
this exchange, offer their initial and concluding 
thoughts to frame this discussion, and served as the 
primary arbiters of what portions of the interchanges 
would be removed or retained.
We start with introductory statements from 
Z. F. and C. V. J. Then we plunge into the dialogue 
with B. D. R. taking the opening move. 
Setting the Context for the Dialogue
Of interest to me (Z. F.) was the unfolding sense of understanding of B. D. R.’s position 
throughout the intense questioning by H. L. 
F., who often pushed to have the difficult-to-
comprehend portions of Heidegger’s and Husserl’s 
work expressed in common language—in effect 
holding B. D. R.’s “feet to the fire” to describe 
these concepts in terms everyone on the list would 
find approachable. H. L. F. also provided a deeply 
skeptical view of subjectivity, while B. D. R. held 
to "privileging the inner, experience, over the outer, 
objective reality." By default, I find myself favoring 
H. L. F.’s bias toward the external, the publically 
accessible, and the “objective.” However, B. D. R.’s 
recitations and exemplars pointing toward the idea 
of das Verliegende, or “letting lie forward,” were 
compelling and, for a brief moment in re-reading 
the manuscript, I no longer saw B. D. R.’s arguments 
as a tautology, but instead suspected that he might 
just be right.
In contrast, at the time of this exchange, I 
(C. V. J.) was fascinated with and lacked fluency 
in phenomenology. The in-depth study of lived 
experience and the search for “the things in 
themselves” appealed to me, as did claims that 
phenomenology successfully addressed the vexing 
problem of Cartesian dualism. I was interested in its 
place in humanistic, existential, and transpersonal 
psychologies, as well as its overall relevance for 
science. I had been trained in qualitative research 
and supported its role in the human sciences, but 
was mostly familiar with other methodologies 
like grounded theory. I wondered what kind of 
philosophy (and research methodology) it was, how 
it was practiced, and what it offered the human 
sciences and transpersonal psychology with its 
emphasis on consciousness and an interconnected 
unity of phenomena. Were its claims defensible? 
Was it worth the time and effort to learn its 
philosophy and methodology? What did it offer 
me as a transpersonal psychologist, a researcher, 
a human being? Why was it held in such high 
esteem among some in humanistic, existential, and 
transpersonal psychology? I found this exchange 
a wonderful introduction to phenomenology and 
philosophy of science, yet also quite erudite and 
worthwhile for those more experienced with these 
issues. Concomitantly, I studied phenomenological 
literature to learn more and ascertain who was more 
correct: B. D. R., with his admirable command of 
phenomenology and qualitative research, and ability 
to clearly communicate its concepts, which many 
find mystifying and enigmatic; or H. L. F., whose 
knowledge of the philosophy of science, training in 
quantitative research methods, and deeply skeptical 
and wily mind pushed ideas and thinkers to their 
limits? Each time I read this exchange, I reached 
a different conclusion. It is truly up to readers to 
decide for themselves.
Is Phenomenology Foundational? 
B D R (1)
 Just as a preliminary reflection on these 
questions, I would say that I do not presume that 
science should always be about prediction and 
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control. Prediction and control exist in the realm of 
explanation but explanation ultimately is grounded 
in description, and description is necessarily 
qualitative in nature. We need to define what it is we 
are studying—what it means—before we can begin 
to even imagine how to predict what will happen to 
it in the future. This process of categorizing things 
has, for example, metaphysical assumptions at its 
roots. This means whether we realize it or not, 
science is always already a metaphysics. A radical 
science attempts to bracket those assumptions and 
question radically the meaning of what it is we are 
studying. That is why I think phenomenology is 
foundational for all of science.
H L F (1) 
B. D. R. stated, "phenomenology is 
foundational for all of science," but I think this 
is only partially true, supported by the notion 
that empiricism rests on perceived phenomena, 
but perhaps contradicted by the notion that 
phenomena present themselves independently of a 
perceiver and, hence, the phenomena (or perhaps 
the noumena presenting to us as phenomena) are 
equally foundational in and of themselves. So this 
framing of phenomenology as foundational seems 
wedded to a Cartesian divide of inner vs. outer, if I 
am understanding it correctly, and one privileging 
the inner, subjective experience, over the outer, 
"objective" reality. In a similar fashion, paraphrasing 
Feynman, "physics and phenomenology are both 
foundational to all science" (Sands, 2011). 
I was thinking about this after reading 
Craig's (2007) incredibly erudite introductory paper 
in The Humanistic Psychologist. His discussions of 
Dasein point in this direction in a clearer fashion 
than I have previously read (or maybe I am now 
more able to hear the message). On the other 
end of the spectrum, ecological psychology (e.g., 
Gibson & Gibson, 1955) and the more recent 
work of Scott Kelso (1995) in dynamic systems 
theory support the growing possibility of a more 
widespread transcending of this annoying Cartesian 
divide by "objective" science. In this sense, I think 
to claim phenomenology as foundational to science 
is a limited view, privileging one perspective over 
another. Am I missing something, B. D. R.? 
Understanding Phenomenology and Dasein
B D R (2) 
Thanks for your questions and willingness 
to engage me on these issues, H. L. F. The key point 
you make is that by stating that phenomenology 
is foundational for all of science, I am therefore 
"wedded to a Cartesian divide of inner vs. outer" and 
"privileging the inner, experience, over the outer, 
objective reality." If I thought phenomenology was 
the study of subjectivity, then, yes, my statement 
would amount to as much as you state. However, 
phenomenology as I understand it is not merely 
the investigation of subjectivity. If phenomenology 
was description of subjectivity and nothing more, 
then I would not endorse the statement that 
phenomenology is the foundation of all science.
If phenomenology is not the description of 
subjectivity, then what is it? To put it as succinctly 
as possible, I will say that phenomenology is a 
"step back" from the epistemological assumptions 
that give rise to the categories of "subjectivity" and 
"objectivity" and, therefore, amounts to a radical 
return to the phenomena as they appear prior to 
such metaphysical claims. More radically, the 
phenomenologist inquires into the very conditions 
of possibility for such questions in the first place. 
In Husserlian language, we can say that 
categories of subjectivity and objectivity are a 
function of the natural attitude—a certain habitual 
and ingrained way of distinguishing between "types" 
of phenomena based on a manner of thinking 
which has not radically questioned its meaning and 
ground (Husserl, 1913/2012; see also Luft, 1998). 
The phenomenological reduction places those 
assumptions in abeyance and begins by a return 
"to the things themselves" prior to preconceptions 
about what is subjective or objective (Husserl, 
1913/2012; see also Schmitt, 1959). 
Within transcendental phenomenology, 
the process moves from this level of description to 
what is called the eidetic reduction or the search 
for what is essential, or better put, the conditions 
of possibility for being-in-the-world. By articulating 
the meaning and ground of being-in-the-world, 
phenomenology is articulating the meaning and 
ground for any inquiry whatsoever, including the 
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 conditions that open the possibility for any science, 
whether human or natural in terms of its content.
Ultimately, this Husserlian project is what 
led Heidegger (1927/2008) to the insights articulated 
in Being and Time, for example, where Dasein is 
understood by the existential analytic as having 
the structure of care. This care structure is the 
grounds for any kind of meaningful investigation 
or any human project for that matter. And Dasein 
is a non-dualistic concept, a radical description of 
world disclosedness, the characteristic of Being prior 
to any metaphysical distinction between subject 
and object, inner or outer, etc. Dasein is literally 
translated as “there-being”—the clearing in which 
we reside in-the-world with others and alongside 
things. What in Dasein is "inner" or "outer"? Where is 
the "subject" of Dasein? These terms are meaningless 
within Heidegger's Daseinanalytic. They become 
irrelevant and antiquated concepts of a Cartesian 
metaphysics that is surpassed by phenomenology. 
And ultimately phenomenology reveals that 
Cartesian metaphysics—actually a worldview pre-
figured prior to Descartes in, for example, Galileo's 
physics and linear perspective art—is a kind of 
nihilism, most famously announced in the form of 
a madman by Nietzsche (1883/2016) in Thus Spake 
Zarathustra. Phenomenology, in turn, is an answer 
to that nihilism—a response to it and, arguably, the 
means to overcome it.
H L F (2) 
I greatly appreciate your explanation and 
I agree that the intent of the notion of Dasein, as 
promulgated by Heidegger, was explicitly to overcome 
the Cartesian divide, even attempting to go beyond 
Husserl's call to "a radical return to the phenomena 
as they appear prior to . . . metaphysical claims." But 
I wonder how well Heidegger really does this? And, 
of course, we are talking about differentiating the 
earlier from the later writings of Heidegger, as his 
presentation of Dasein is acknowledged by scholars 
to have shifted considerably in his later writings—
and I am only really familiar with his early Being 
and Time (Heidegger, 1927/2008). And I can't go too 
deeply into this, as it has been years since I have 
read Heidegger and, even then, I found his writings 
abstruse (as most do), despite my diligence in 
attempting to understand him. With that said, I don't 
want to be too tied to Heidegger as an authority 
in any discussion of how phenomenology might 
or might not offer a cogent way to transcend the 
Cartesian divide.
So where is my critique of your using the 
term “phenomenology as foundational,” as opposed 
to seeing physics as also foundational? It seems to 
me that Dasein is unavoidably anthropocentric, at 
least as I understand Heidegger's use of it. Perhaps 
it endeavors to be more than subjectivistic and 
attempts to move into the world to see things as 
they are in some pre-linguistic and non-categorically 
mediated way, but even this is always limited to a 
human seeing, hence is tinged with subjectivity, 
even if a broadened species-shared "we" form of 
subjectivity—if that were to be possible. 
Presumably a foundational physics, 
however, could be entertained across species, even 
into strangely alien cultures. I am thinking of the use 
of icons, such as depicting pi in various ways scribed 
onto some of our human transplanetary exploration 
vessels now heading into the unknown with hopes 
of contacting alien consciousnesses. Here is where 
physics, and its accompanying mathematics, might 
better transcend anthropocentrism and, in that 
sense, be just as foundational as phenomenology 
or, perhaps, even more so. So to privilege 
phenomenology as foundational seems limited 
and, alternatively, it seems better to consider both 
foundational. I note I took this on in an analogous 
way recently, suggesting in a paper that such dualisms 
(focusing on transcendence and immanence) 
could best be resolved dialectically by positing 
complementary, but seemingly incommensurate, 
positions to be held simultaneously, since neither or 
both could be seen as foundational or amenable, 
at least by me, to a decent synthesis (Friedman & 
Pappas, 2006). 
I fear that the Dasein project attempted by 
Heidegger failed and, worse, I fear that the abstruse 
language in which it was clothed has deluded 
some into thinking it successful, since pontifical 
obfuscation can bamboozle those who read more 
with hope for confirmation than with the open-
minded but skeptical willingness to reject critically 
when flaws are revealed. Part of why I hold this fear 
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is Heidigger's own life course and, although I hate 
to criticize ad hominem, he seemed to abandon his 
own project, first to Nazism and later to a return to 
Shopenhauer's grand theorizing (at least as I recall 
from reading some Heideggerian critics years ago, 
since I have no first-reading knowledge of this) and 
as a mystic delving into Eastern traditions. Ultimately, 
to share my deeper interest, I want to write on the 
difference between "knowing" and "knowledge" 
and our present discussion is in one of the germane 
areas to this topic where I feel quite confused.
B D R (3) 
The correspondence view of truth is one 
of those implicit presuppositions—one of those 
metaphysical assumptions I mentioned earlier—
that comes under scrutiny once we engage in 
the phenomenological reduction. Heidegger's 
(1927/2008) Being and Time questioned the grounds 
for the correspondence theory of truth, and arrived 
at (what Heidegger claimed is) a more primordial 
understanding of truth as a revealing-concealing 
advent of Being (aletheia). 
For a nice outline of this problem, see Robert 
Cavelier's (2017) notes on "The Problem of Truth."  
The upshot basically is that what we understand 
to be "natural science," for example, Newtonian 
physics, is based on a particular understanding of 
truth that does reveal things, but at the same time 
it conceals other ways of understanding things in 
the more primordial disclosedness that is truth in its 
more basic (implicitly) lived meaning. 
Phenomenology and Physics 
as Foundational to Knowing
H L F (3) 
In dealing with these extreme counter-
examples, I am merely showing ways a physics could 
exist and even develop without a phenomenology—
in that sense it is foundational (i.e., it would not be 
reducible to phenomenology and would be its own 
foundation). I also think a phenomenology could 
exist without a physics (i.e., it would not be reducible 
to physics), such as consciousness during locked-in 
syndrome (pseudocoma) with a person devoid of 
all sensory input, as well as motor output. But can 
either be "comprehensive" without the other? This is 
where I think the both/and makes the most sense, 
and seeing phenomenology as more foundational 
or primary than physics appears somewhat lacking. 
Again, however, this leads to a dilemma that 
I cannot reconcile, except by willingness to posit 
both sides of the divide simultaneously as a both/
and. As Robbins and Craig (2007) have pointed out, 
the concept of Dasein is an attempt to transcend this 
divide, but I have never understood how it could 
successfully do this (and I've tried, but couldn't 
grasp it), and now I suspect it is more aspirational 
than fait accompli. And there are some parallel 
attempts, as I've mentioned, using physical notions 
(e.g., complex systems theory) that go far in a similar 
direction from an opposite starting place but, I 
also suspect, they do not work very well either in 
giving a full accounting. I fear I can only offer more 
questions than answers, but maybe I misunderstand 
Dasein, since I surely do not claim to understand 
it well. This is where I hope you might show how 
phenomenology is fundamental to science in a way 
that physics is not, as I am more questioning that 
claim than making any coherent claim of my own.
B D R (4) 
I would say that (most) physics is more 
anthropocentric than Heidegger's conception of 
Dasein. The reason for this is because physics, 
which is a human activity of attempting to explain 
the physical world in terms that will permit 
prediction and control of it, and essentially to map 
it for human purposes, is usually confused with the 
physical world in itself (see, e.g., Merchant, 1990). 
The map, in effect, is confused with the countryside 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962). In contrast, Heidegger's 
existential analytic, and the formulation of Dasein 
and the care structure, is actually the explication 
of the limits of human understanding—human 
finitude—rather than an attempt to reduce reality to 
human understanding.
Anthropocentricism in phenomenology 
could, however, be applied to Sartre, for example, 
who was chastised by Heidegger (1977/1993) in his 
"Letter on Humanism" for being too anthropocentric 
in his interpretation of his work. One can understand 
and appreciate physics (and its limits) via Heidegger 
and other forms of phenomenology, but one cannot 
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appreciate the existential analytic via physics. This is 
a one-way street.
Second, it is important when reading 
Heidegger, and most other phenomenologists, 
to avoid any temptation to read phenomenology 
as an attempt to identify a pre-linguistic or non-
categorical world. Your transpersonal background 
might pre-dispose you to identify Heidegger with 
Zen Buddhism or certain mystical traditions that are 
all about accessing a kind of unmediated connection 
to the Divine or Nature that is in principle ineffable. 
But that is not what Heidegger is doing, as far as I 
understand his project. No question, Heidegger was 
influenced by some of these mystical traditions—
and probably most especially Meister Eckart, not to 
mention Aquinas, who was not quite a mystic—but, 
nevertheless, I think it is important to read Heidegger 
as up to something different than the mystics.
He does not deny that language is essential 
to the human condition—it is an equiprimordial 
constituent of Dasein's existential structure—but, as 
any good phenomenologist would do, he radically 
interrogates the question of what language is in 
the first place. For example, in several of his essays 
he identifies a particular way of understanding 
language in our current age which is configured 
by a technological way of understanding things 
and is thus contingent and, by implication, does 
not adequately capture what is essential about the 
meaning of language (Caputo, 1982, 1986). 
In any case, as long as one reduces 
phenomenology to that of a description of 
subjectivity, one will not understand just how 
radical phenomenology is, and how physics is 
already guided by a set of implicit assumptions that 
only phenomenology can identify. The point is that 
physics is often ahead of itself in its understanding of 
what the world is all about. Even though it is guided 
by implicit meanings, these are not explicit to the 
practice of physics but unconscious, in a certain 
manner of speaking. Phenomenology does the work 
of identifying what physics has to assume in order to 
even get started, and by doing this, phenomenology 
questions radically the meaning and ground of 
the project of physics—not to say that physics is 
wrong or incorrect within its own framework of 
understanding, but rather to make that framework 
explicit as a particular framework of meaning that 
could have been otherwise—that is, in essence, 
contingent. And in that sense phenomenology is 
foundational for physics and any science, for that 
matter. It is the only method (I know of) that can 
retrieve what would otherwise remain the meaning 
and ground of science—not to mention any other 
human activity.
I anticipate that some would return the favor 
and say that physics studies the physical world that is 
the condition of possibility for human existence (and 
knowing) and, therefore, also for phenomenological 
thinking. In a certain manner of speaking, yes, of 
course it does, and it would be silly to deny it. But it 
is not in this sense that I say phenomenology is the 
foundation of physics. 
When I say phenomenology is foundational 
for all of science, including physics, I mean that 
phenomenology is foundational to the human 
activity of physics, not the physical world itself. 
But there are a wide variety of ways to disclose 
the meaning of the physical world, and physics is 
only one—which does not diminish the science of 
physics in the least bit, but simply puts it in its place.
H L F (4) 
I am glad you acknowledge that both share 
anthropocentrisms, but you claim physics to be 
more so. I still am unclear why one would be more 
so than the other. 
Most good physicists would not confound 
the map with the territory, so this seems a 
specious argument against physics. And doesn't 
phenomenology try to explain in human terms 
also, as well as predict to some degree, just as 
does physics? And neither is invested necessarily in 
control, such as illustrated by astrophysics, where 
there is no intention to control the stars—at least 
any time soon.
Interesting, human finitude understood 
through Dasein as a formulation of the limit of human 
understanding vs. the finitude of physical existence 
as the ground of any human understanding—now 
why is one primary over the other? And is physics 
necessarily concerned with human knowing as 
much as generating knowledge? I think of Feynman's 
oft quoted remarks, "I think I can safely say that no 
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one understands quantum mechanics” (as cited in 
Carroll, 2011, para. 3). 
So, if physics is concerned with knowledge, 
not knowing per se, doesn't that make it primary to 
phenomenology regarding knowledge, but perhaps 
phenomenology is prior to physics for knowing. 
And, if so, what is foundational to science becomes 
equally split between knowing and knowledge, 
both equally foundational if both are equally 
germane to science. And, if phenomenology is 
more primary to knowing and knowing is privileged 
over knowledge as germane to science, it seems 
that puts phenomenology back into being more 
subjectivistic, defeating the attempt of Dasein to 
integrate subject/object and throwing it back into 
privileging subjectivity. 
To quote you, B. D. R.: “One can 
understand and appreciate physics (and its limits) 
via Heidegger and other forms of phenomenology, 
but one cannot appreciate the existential analytic 
via physics. This is a one-way street.” This is the 
crux of the argument—is one more irreducible to 
the other? And I would argue still, that one perhaps 
can only fully understand the existential analytic 
by knowledge of physical existence, which is the 
ground for all existential understanding. So both still 
seem equally foundational to me. 
B. D. R., you said: “In any case, as long as 
one reduces phenomenology to that of a description 
of subjectivity.” I am willing to entertain this idea as 
the intent of the concept of Dasein, though I doubt it 
ever achieves its attempt to fully escape subjectivity, 
which is why I see it as more aspiration than actual. 
Are you familiar with the Gibsons' (1955, 1979) 
work on ecological psychology that "throws" (to use 
Heidegger's term) consciousness (i.e., perception) 
into the world without any dualisms or homunculi? 
And Kelso's (1995) and others' dynamic systems 
theory (e.g., see Thelen, 1995), which makes 
minimal assumptions and relies on self-organizing, 
rather than a-priori imposed assumptions (or at least 
minimizes such assumptions)? 
I think you underestimate the astuteness 
of many physicists, perhaps confusing them with 
engineers? And physicists, who vary assumptions to 
explore their differential implications, seem overall 
freer from such constraints than phenomenologists, 
who acknowledge the limitations of any attempts to 
bracket. So, can a physics get started as a human 
enterprise and, through that process, proceed in ways 
that rapidly veer from human limitations (e.g., through 
radically extending human perceptual limitations 
and using mathematics and other extrapolations to 
discover that which the more purposefully naïve 
phenomenological stance could never accomplish) 
and perhaps accomplish the ultimate bracketing 
(e.g., having an artificial intelligence [AI] process 
devoid of human bias, at least once launched from 
a human initiative)? Yes, just what I was thinking in 
considering both as equally foundation and both 
with similar, complementary, limits.
So here is the crux. Does physics only reveal 
a socially-constructed map of the territory or is there 
some revealing of the territory provided by physics 
that is not just anthropocentric and that places 
physics not just as one revelation among many (the 
postmodern relativistic leveling of all truth claims, 
equating the worth of the view of physics with that 
of even the biblical view), but something more 
substantial, touching toward the real or perhaps, 
phenomenologically speaking, the essence? In other 
words, is physics discovering something objectively 
true about external reality or merely relatively true 
limited by human perception and interpretation thus 
constructing a distorted, anthropocentric reality? I 
think physics is discovering something externally 
valid, but what are your thoughts? 
B D R (5) 
I would want to be careful about taking 
too seriously any claims that physics is "socially-
constructed," because I think this term comes with a 
lot of epistemological and ontological baggage that 
I would not want to claim for phenomenology. I'd 
rather say that physics is indeed disclosing a truth 
about the world. But it is not the only way of disclosing 
truth about the physical world. By clarifying the way 
of revealing truth (in the Greek sense of aletheia) as it 
occurs in physics, and contrasting and comparing it 
with other types of disclosing, this helps us recognize 
the limits of physics without having to throw out 
the field as we know it. Now, how would we go 
about interrogating the meaning of "truth" in ways 
that get at something essential that can accompany 
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not only the kind of disclosure of truth that happens 
in physics but also, say, engineering as you 
mentioned, or art, poetry, theology, or ethics? That's 
a job for phenomenology—not phenomenological 
psychology, but phenomenological philosophy. This 
is what is meant by the correspondence theory of 
truth–a way of understanding truth that is implicit in 
modern science, but also a very short-sighted way of 
understanding truth. In other words, the essence of 
truth has to be at least assumed before we can even 
begin to ask whether physics gets at an essential 
truth about the physical world. The latter question is 
necessarily preliminary to the former. 
Secondly, I disagree that phenomenology 
results in a leveling-down of truth claims. Actually, 
I would say that the modern tendency to level-
down truth-claims—and the correlative modern 
relativism—is actually a by-product of the same 
worldview that gives rise to modern science. 
Modernism and post-modernism are like Siamese 
twins, tied at the hip. In both cases, the question 
of what truth claim is more valuable than another 
truth claim hinges on the ontology of values, which 
in the modern worldview is subordinated to fact. 
The fact-value dichotomy is a result of the same 
subject-object dichotomy that phenomenology 
seeks to radically question and overcome. When 
facts are split-off from values, then it literally 
becomes impossible to determine which facts are 
more valuable than others. Values actually just 
creep in implicitly without being acknowledged 
and so become a kind of unconscious dynamic 
operating below the surface of any science, guiding 
its activity, but all the while denied. It's easy to see 
this in psychology—the examples of the DSM and 
positive psychology are obvious ones—but more 
difficult to see in physics. But look at the work of 
Thomas Kuhn (1962), for example, and we can see a 
similar dynamics going on in the history of physics. 
The drama behind what facts get counted and which 
ones get discounted is not unlike a soap opera, 
guided by sets of competing values about what gets 
to count as a fact and what does not, about what 
methods get to count as legitimate methods, and so 
on. 
I think phenomenology provides the means 
of overcoming the fact-value dichotomy and the 
subject-object dualism that gives rise to it; therefore, 
it provides a foundation in which different ways of 
disclosing truth can be identified: variously, as more 
important or less important, more legitimate and/
or less legitimate than others, but in a way that is 
systematic and in the final analysis, demonstrable. 
That is at least my hope because I do not believe 
that phenomenology has accomplished this task yet, 
though I believe in principle that phenomenology 
is capable of doing this. I do not believe physics is 
capable of doing it. However, I think the study of 
physics and the examination of how the science 
of physics is conducted—that is, how truth is 
(implicitly) understood in physics as well as in other 
fields—is very important for that project.
 
What is Thinking? 
Furthermore, one of Heidegger's (1954/1968) most important works—and the most important work, 
according to Heidegger himself—is translated as 
"What is Called Thinking?" In that work, Heidegger 
suggests that what calls-to-be-thought is what we 
call thinking. Thinking itself is calling to be thought 
about more deeply, more radically. The intentional 
ambiguity in Heidegger’s title, in the German, lends 
itself to two interpretations. On the one hand, “what 
is called thinking” can be interpreted to mean asking 
about what thinking is. On the other hand, Heidegger 
is pointing toward a different type of thinking that 
has been neglected, a type of meditative thought 
that patiently waits for what calls to be thought 
about. Whereas, rationality in Enlightenment-era, 
modern thought has become comparatively violent, 
imposing a kind of will-to-power on the world, in 
a technological way. For example, Hubert Dreyfus 
(1992), through the influence of Heidegger, was able 
to show how the project of AI would fail because 
it had not considered the way human thought 
is integrally related to feeling, perception, and 
embodiment.
Imaginative variation was not Heidegger's 
notion, but Husserl’s (see Spiegelberg, 1982; see 
also Giorgi, 2012). And I would not put imaginative 
variation in a box with "thinking," because many 
cognitive operations that go by the name "thinking" 
are not anything like what Husserl (1913/2012) meant 
by imaginative variation. Imaginative variation is 
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much more specifically a process of varying the 
constituents of a phenomenon and systematically 
eliminating those variations which are not essential 
to the phenomenon until, in principle, one is 
left only with what cannot be varied without the 
phenomenon ceasing to be what it is in its essence 
(Giorgi, 2012). 
Now, there is a certain sense that one 
must already understand what the essence of a 
phenomenon is if one is to "know" one has arrived at 
the essence, once the analysis is complete. That's the 
hermeneutic circle at play in the work—a catching 
sight of how one always already understands the 
phenomenon, but implicitly rather than explicitly 
(Packer & Addison, 1989). Giorgi's (2009) approach, 
in my opinion, did not acknowledge the hermeneutic, 
interpretative dimensions of any description but 
makes a distinction between interpretation and 
description that is a false dichotomy (see Hein 
& Austin, 2001). I see some of your remarks as 
speaking to a similar concern although you seem 
to often speak of psychic facts as if they were of the 
same nature as factual things in the world, and that 
is to confuse the noetic with the noematic structures 
of consciousness, in my view. 
H L F (5) 
First, I am glad you and I agree that the 
“distinction between interpretation and description 
. . . is a false dichotomy.” (B. D. R., 5). I understand 
this is one of the differences between Heidegger 
and Husserl’s thought, so Giorgi appears aligned 
with Husserl on this while we appear more to be 
Heideggerian, though I approach my position from 
a totally different tradition than phenomenology. 
Second, you stated that “Heidegger suggests 
that what calls to be thought is what we call thinking. 
Thinking itself is calling to be thought about more 
deeply, more radically.” I must admit I find this type 
of phraseology to be tortuous. In some ways, the 
phrasing appeals to me, stirring some interesting 
reflections, but overall it makes me want to flee from 
such twists and turns. In what sense does thinking, 
a process of mentation, call “to be thought about 
more deeply, more radically?” Is that not attributing 
an anthropomorphic act, calling, to a limited 
cognitive process, thinking? And is it not just simpler 
to say, “one can think more deeply about thinking, 
since that process involves many complexities and 
even mysteries?” And why is Husserl’s imaginative 
variation not a type of thinking? I can acknowledge 
it is not equal to all the myriad possibilities of how 
thought can operate, as you say, "because many 
cognitive operations that go by the name ‘thinking’ 
are not anything like what Husserl meant by 
imaginative variation." 
But isn’t “a process of varying the 
constituents of a phenomenon, and systematically 
eliminating those variations that are not essential 
to the phenomenon until, in principle, one is 
left only with what cannot be varied without the 
phenomenon ceasing to be what it is in its essence” 
a systematic thought process, albeit just one among 
many possible thought processes (which is my 
protest, since I prefer my own idiosyncratic thought 
processes to be more unconstrained as I cogitate 
on stuff), as well as I think doomed to failure since 
I do not believe in Husserl’s notion of essences, at 
least as I understand his position on that: although 
Husserl appeared to deny being an idealist, I 
believe his notion of essences places him in this 
camp as he privileges pure consciousness and deals 
with phenomena as presented to consciousness 
rather than as ontologically real. Thus, I interpret 
his attempt to grasp essences as a movement away 
from the phenomena as ontologically real and 
toward idealism privileging subjectivity. Heidegger, 
in this regard, seems to have made some advances 
over Husserl, though I still have difficulty with many 
of his positions.
In addition, you claim that I “seem to often 
speak of psychic facts as if they were of the same 
nature as factual things in the world, and that is to 
confuse the noetic with the noematic structures 
of consciousness.” I hope you can tell me where I 
made this supposed error and we can discuss it. We 
learn from our errors and I hope you can provide 
a learning opportunity for me, although there is a 
possibility that the learning could be reversed and 
perhaps it is your error? Let’s see  and not as a win-
lose contest, but as a mutual exploration for our 
common betterment. 
Although I might preface this request to 
explore a supposed confusion with the observation 
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that I find the distinction between noesis and noema 
abstruse, so these probably need to be explicated 
from your point of view before we can talk about 
whether or not I am confused. If you interpret these 
simply as subject/experience/meaning and object/
experienced/meant respectively, as some do, I 
would simply question why use such uncommon 
language, if not to obfuscate, and suggest we talk 
in more common terms. But, if you use these terms 
in a more complex and specified way, perhaps 
invoking these terms may be useful and I can learn 
to converse in this language, unless they violate my 
sense of proper order (if so, maybe we could then 
create some new language that would be more 
mutually satisfying). From Husserl’s perspective, and 
grant that I am working from memory dating back 
over 4 decades since I last read Husserl, noema 
are not ontologically real, but more akin to Platonic 
forms and therefore not “factual.”
One reason I am engaging in this discussion 
is I want to understand the possible potential of 
phenomenological thought/language to bridge 
various dualities for which I have no language 
to express now. One possible solution to my 
quest might be in Husserl’s correlation of noetic/
noematic, as well as in a deeper understanding of 
Dasein as a holistic expression of unity. However, 
where I am really befuddled on this topic is putting 
phenomenology into action, as in research. I 
see phenomenological studies as not solving the 
problems of dualisms with which I struggle, but only 
working the more subjective side of dualities. In that 
regard, I appreciate their potential to dialectically 
complement more quantitative studies working the 
more objective side—and, using both can give a 
more comprehensive understanding. I think your 
mixed methods paper in The Humanistic Psychologist 
did this marvelously (Robbins & Vandree, 2009). 
But how this approach could possibly bridge these 
dualities alone, such as through correlating noetic/
noematic and approaching an understanding of 
Dasein, in practice eludes me. Is that possible and, 
if so, how?
B D R (6) 
Yes, traditionally, Husserl and Heidegger have 
been commented upon as differing in their projects. 
Husserl, founder of transcendental phenomenology, 
sought to arrive at a de-contextualized, neo-Platonic 
essence. Heidegger, founder of hermeneutic 
phenomenology, aimed to explicate what is always 
already understood as being lived through as being-
in-the-world. At the same time, Husserl's thinking 
was dynamic and changed considerably over the 
course of his life and I think as his work evolved 
over time it was moving in the same direction as 
Heidegger's insights (see, e.g., Crowell, 2001; Barua, 
2007; Overgaard, 2004). 
 As for Heidegger's turn of phrase, "What 
is Called Thinking? (Was heisst denken?),” it is a 
pun, a play on words, and does not translate into 
English well; hence, the reason it seems "tortured" 
in English. Maybe it seems tortured in German too, 
I don't know. But the pun is what matters here. The 
question can be interpreted as either "What is called 
thinking?" or "What calls for thinking?" If we phrased 
it differently, it would lose the word-play Heidegger 
is engaged in here. The key to the text, and the key 
to understand what Heidegger means by what he 
sometimes calls "meditative thinking" (as opposed 
to "calculative thinking") is to understand the 
importance of the play between the two questions 
implied in the ambiguous title. 
The key passage in this text is the following: 
"Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking 
time is that we are still not thinking" (Heidegger, 
1954/1968, p. 6). As Stark (1998) has suggested, 
this passage can be understood best by analyzing 
the three major components of the sentence: "most 
thought provoking," "in our thought provoking time," 
and "we are still not thinking." What does Heidegger 
mean by saying "most thought provoking" in the 
above passage? By asking what is most thought 
provoking, surely, Heidegger is implying that to 
begin thinking at all, one must always already be 
engaged with something that provokes thought. 
To think, that is, is already to think about that 
which most calls for thinking. Indeed, Heidegger is 
saying as well that one is not thinking if one has 
not already considered thinking of that which is 
worthy of thought. With that said, we can clarify the 
ambiguity of Heidegger's title. Heidegger means to 
playfully demonstrate that even to begin addressing 
the question of what thinking is called, one must 
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also answer at the same time the question of what 
calls for thinking (see Robbins, 2014). 
Heidegger's point, as subtle or tortured as it 
may be, is quite revolutionary in that it contradicts 
most contemporary theories of rationality. Such 
theories of rationality typically consider thinking 
to be a matter of following the correct method. 
In other words, thinking becomes reduced to a 
“rationality” that is a means to an end: thinking, that 
is, is reduced to instrumental or calculative reason. 
Yet such a calculative reason is oblivious to the all-
important question (for Heidegger) that asks what 
one's thinking should be about. The about-ness 
of calculative rationality is taken for granted (note: 
Look at how similar this insight is to Husserl's notion 
of intentionality).
The calculative rationalizing philosopher 
is thoughtless with regard to what is most worthy 
of thought. To put it in the terms of Max Weber 
(1922/1978), we can translate Heidegger to be 
saying that instrumental rationality as a means to 
an end always already implies a substantive rational 
end to the instrumental method. But instrumental 
rationality remains oblivious of and thoughtless in 
regard to what it is calculating about. In essence, 
such a calculative rationality would inevitably 
degenerate into a vicious circle of calculations merely 
for the sake of calculations. Indeed, it is just such a 
calculative circularity that is the descriptive of what 
Heidegger calls the Gestell, the technological world 
that orders merely for the sake of further ordering 
and in which things and persons are disclosed 
merely as resources standing by awaiting further 
ordering (Heidegger, 1971b). Sounds like most 20th 
century psychology, doesn't it? But Heidegger's text 
reveals that there are other ways to understand what 
it means to think—and he aims to recover a Greek 
sense of thinking—and an attending to Being—that 
he believes has been lost to us, at our own detriment. 
He will make a distinction, for example, between 
thinking as speaking and thinking as gathering (see 
Robbins, 2014)—but that would take some time to 
lay out, so I will leave it for now.
Whether imaginative variation is a type 
of "thinking" depends on what one means by the 
term "thinking." If one is prone to make a distinction 
between thinking and perceiving, for example, then 
I would say it is more than a type of thinking —
it is a type of imaginative perception. When one 
is engaged in imaginative variation, the variations 
are experientially varied. One is varying the 
phenomenon's possibilities with the aim to identify 
which of those possibilities are essential to the 
phenomenon's identity. 
Is this an impossible task once one is no 
longer engaged in transcendental phenomenology? 
It can still be done, and the task is still a worthy one, 
in my opinion, because the essence is not a Platonic 
essence, but a situated essence. The "essence" in 
this sense is an explicit articulation of an implicitly 
understood phenomenon as it is lived out pre-
thematically within a life-world context. The essence 
is situated, contextual, and not universal or eternal 
(yet, at the same time, not arbitrary). So, one has 
to keep in mind that the term "essence," if retained 
within a hermeneutic process, has to take on a very 
different meaning. And if that is confusing, perhaps 
a better word is in order, and I have not come up 
with one that really works. The term "archetype" 
has the same import as "essence," and so does not 
solve the problem. I somewhat like Goethe's term 
"Ur-phenomenon" (see Robbins, 2006).
With regard to the noesis/noema: this 
distinction between noesis and noema does not map 
onto the subject-object duality as we use "subjective" 
and "objective" conventionally. It is, on the contrary, 
an attempt like Heidegger's being-in-the-world to 
transcend that dualism. This is difficult to define in 
the abstract, because it is best understood in the 
practice of phenomenology. Nothing in the English 
language does it justice. A key to understanding the 
noesis/noema distinction is to understand Husserl's 
notion of intentionality (Husserl, 1913/2012; see also 
Drummond, 2012; Duranti, 1999; Føllesdal, 1969; 
Sartre, 1939/2014; Smith & McIntyre, 1982; Zahavi, 
2004). Intentionality is the term Husserl uses to 
designate an essential structure of consciousness—
that it is always about something. Consciousness 
is never just consciousness and nothing else. It is 
always consciousness of something. This is very 
similar to Heidegger's reflections on thinking, 
no? Thinking is always already about something. 
Thinking doesn't become radical until it questions 
the very grounds for thinking about anything. That's 
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Heidegger's point, and his point is roughly the same 
sentiment as Husserl's, as I understand it. 
Thus, given that intentionality is the structure 
of consciousness, then we can say that anything 
that is given to consciousness is going to involve 
(a) that which is being disclosed to consciousness 
(e.g. the perceptual field), and also (b) the activity 
of consciousness by which the former is disclosed. 
That which is being disclosed to consciousness, 
(a), is the noema, and the acts of consciousness 
by which the former is disclosed, (b), is the noesis. 
The noesis is only disclosed indirectly via a special 
attitude toward the noema (the phenomenological 
reduction, or in other words, the bracketing of the 
natural attitude). 
Let's take embarrassment as a case in point 
(Robbins & Vandree, 2009). When I am embarrassed, 
the noema is the appearance of one's self through 
the eyes of the other as exposed or revealed in a 
way that is unwanted. This is the "life-world" of 
embarrassment. It is the noema of embarrassment: 
that which is disclosed to consciousness when one 
is embarrassed. By describing this life-world of 
embarrassment, we can then indirectly identify the 
conditions necessary for consciousness to be able to 
disclose this kind of life-world. For example, we can 
identify through the life-world of embarrassment 
how consciousness includes the capacity to 
constitute itself through the imaginative projection 
into another person's point-of-view. In other words, 
consciousness has the noetic capacity for empathy 
and this empathic ability is a necessary condition 
for embarrassment. This can be corroborated by 
developmental research that shows that empathy 
and embarrassment appear at about the same age 
developmentally in children (Bischof-Kohler, 1991; 
Eisenberg, 2000; Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 
1989). 
It is easy to confuse noesis and noema. 
Where I see confusion in this conversation is, for 
example, when there is discussion of language (or 
other contextual factors) acting as a "mediator" 
between the scientist/investigator and the structure 
of consciousness. In phenomenology, there is no 
"mediator" between the noesis and the noema, 
because they are two sides of the same coin—
this is not a causal relationship. It is not that we 
have consciousness or subjectivity and then 
objectivity, and the things are mediating the 
relationship between the two. If anything, both 
noesis and noema would be situated on the side of 
"subjectivity." But of course saying this would put 
us into the problem of solipsism, because clearly 
noema is not merely subjective, it is also revealing 
of things that transcend consciousness. To perform 
phenomenology adequately, therefore, one must 
begin by suspending any judgment about what is or 
is not subjective or objective and instead attend to 
how the noema can inform us about the noetic acts 
of consciousness. What transcends consciousness is 
not at issue as much as the structure of consciousness 
itself in Husserlian phenomenology. The problem 
of language is tricky, but for now, suffice it to say 
that within the context of the phenomenological 
reduction, language is part of the noetic acts of 
consciousness by which the noema is able to appear 
as it does, and so is not a mediator as much as a 
medium by which consciousness does what it does 
in the process of disclosing a world. 
H L F (6) 
Reading these guys puts Occam’s razor to 
shame, as one needs a heavy samurai sword, not a 
mere razor, to cut through these Gordian knots. It 
seems, at least on the surface, that there are some 
tautologies in this strand of reasoning. If the answer 
is implied in the question, as Socrates demonstrated 
in Plato’s Meno (but through leading questions), 
then the hare can indeed never catch the tortoise, 
per Meno’s paradox. Yet we know this paradox is 
invalid. Cannot thinking lead to new knowledge and 
be serendipitous, as opposed to being pre-ordained 
toward an object without exception—as in non-
directed meditation or contemplation? 
You said, for example, "But instrumental 
rationality remains oblivious of and thoughtless in 
regard to what it is calculating about. . . .Sounds 
like most 20th century psychology, doesn't it?" (B. 
D. R., 6). Not really. I can see value in distinguishing 
calculative rationality, as in what a computer 
can perform, from other sorts of thinking. But 
Heidegger’s notion of thinking seems quite different 
from modern cognitive approaches, which offer 
great insight not yet known in Heidegger’s day. You 
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said, "But Heidegger's text reveals that there are 
other ways to understand what it means to think . . 
. . He will make a distinction, for example, between 
thinking as speaking and thinking as gathering” (B. 
D. R., 6). You also said: "imaginative variation  . . 
. . is varying the phenomenon's possibilities with 
the aim to identify which of those possibilities are 
essential to the phenomenon's identity" (B. D. R., 6). 
Ah, now here is something I can bite into. Simply 
put, I consider perception to be part of thinking, as 
in selective perception requiring some implicit, if 
not conscious, thought. But I do not want to go too 
far into this now. 
You said, "Is this an impossible task once 
one is no longer engaged in transcendental 
phenomenology? . . . I sort of like Goethe's term, 
'Ur-phenomenon'" (B. D. R., 6). Now if we are going 
to define essence in a non-platonic way, I will have 
to think about what it might mean. And Goethe’s 
term helps me not at all. Could we discuss in simpler 
ways, such as you telling me what you think essence 
means in this Heideggerian fashion.
You said, the "distinction between noesis 
and noema does not map onto the subject-object 
duality as we use "subjective" and "objective" 
conventionally" (B. D. R., 6). I do note that many 
define noesis/noema as reflecting the perceiving 
subject and the perceived object, so you are 
obviously using it in a special phenomenological 
way. You said, “It is, on the contrary, an attempt, like 
Heidegger's being-in-the-world, to transcend that 
dualism” (B. D. R., 6). Now we are getting closer to 
where I want to explore. You said, “This is difficult to 
define in the abstract, because it is best understood 
in the practice of phenomenology. Nothing in the 
English language does it justice” (B. D. R., 6). Yikes! 
We can’t talk about this in English? What about the 
notion that all natural languages are fluid enough to 
express any thought that can be expressed in any 
natural language. And German, through different 
from English, isn’t that different. It’s not like translating 
a word from Hopi to English, after all. I must concede, 
this is why I attempted to read these guys in German 
years ago, since I hit this semantic wall. Reading 
the German did not help. Maybe I should rely on 
secondary sources, but I rarely trust them. You said, 
"A key to understanding the noesis/noema distinction 
is to understand Husserl's notion of intentionality. 
. . . It is always consciousness of something" (B. 
D. R., 6). I can go with this, though I am not sure 
there is no pure consciousness (as in lucid deep 
dreamless sleep or certain meditative states). You 
said, “Thinking is always already about something. 
Thinking doesn't become radical until it questions 
the very grounds for thinking about anything” (B. D. 
R., 6). I do not see that as radical, just another topic 
for thought. You said, “That which is being disclosed 
to consciousness, (a), is the noema, and the acts of 
consciousness by which the former is disclosed, (b), 
is the noesis” (B. D. R., 6). How is this not simply 
the object of experience and the subjectivity as a 
process of the experiencer, respectively? 
You said, "The noesis is only disclosed 
indirectly via . . . the bracketing of the natural 
attitude" (B. D. R., 6). Becoming aware of how we 
process our experience seems knowable, but only 
to some degree in my opinion—as much occurs in 
deep biological ways that do not seem amenable to 
any conscious knowing. Also, this seems different 
from how I’ve understood the phenomenological 
reduction, which is as a reduction of the object to 
its essence (whatever that is?). And not involving the 
subjective process, but I have heard of a distinction 
between transcendent and non-transcendent 
phenomenology, so you must be talking here about 
only one version of this. In addition, we are learning 
so much now on how thinking occurs through 
scientific advances, such as in neuroscience, that it 
seems any bracketing to get to this is possibly futile 
(e.g., some unconscious processes occur much 
quicker than consciousness can follow). 
You said, "When I am embarrassed, the 
noema is the appearance of one's self through the 
eyes of the other as exposed in a way that is unwanted. 
This is the "life-world" of embarrassment" (B. D. R., 
6). It makes sense to talk about a person’s life-world, 
but does an experience, like embarrassment, have a 
life-world? That makes me uncomfortable. You said, 
"It is the noema of embarrassment . . . . This can 
be corroborated by developmental research which 
shows that empathy and embarrassment appear at 
about the same age developmentally in children" (B. 
D. R., 6). Now this is another concept to which I 
can relate, as so-called objective research on the 
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development of empathy can be used to show that it 
occurs at the same time as embarrassment begins to 
be experienced—yes, I know some of these studies. 
So imaginative projection might lead to entertaining 
notions shown by development research. Just some 
good old-fashioned theorizing, as is abundant in 
the embarrassment vs. shame literature—much of it 
psychoanalytic, which arrived at these notions in a 
simpler way. What does phenomenology offer that 
these do not? You said, "It is easy to confuse noesis 
and noema. . . . there is no 'mediator' between the 
noesis and the noema, because they are two sides of 
the same coin—this is not a causal relationship" (B. 
D. R., 6). My claim for mediation here is not to claim 
causation, but only reciprocal relatedness—and 
this does not contradict that these are inextricably 
inter-related, only they use more dualistic language. 
But noesis/noema together are also dualistic, so 
what advantage is gained by their use? Actually, I 
see one advantage, but it is not one I like, namely 
that by denying the noema any ontological reality, 
there can be a consistent idealism without having to 
proffer inner/outer dualities, as it all can be held as 
inner or subjective. As much as I dislike mind-body 
dualisms, I dislike all idealisms and all materialisms 
even more. Am I missing something big here? 
Last here, is this a confusion on my part or 
simply our attempt to communicate using different 
concepts/languages and underlying assumptions? I 
reckon that neither of us are to the point of being 
confused more than the other, but both are likely 
in a state of partial knowing of the other’s thoughts. 
And I am discovering my own thoughts better 
as we explore. You said, "It is not that we have 
consciousness or subjectivity and then objectivity 
. . . both noesis and noema would be situated on 
the side of 'subjectivity'" (B. D. R., 6). Yes—and this 
may be an advantage in terms of consistency, but 
not in terms of veridicality with an outside world 
seen as also real and requiring engagement. You 
said, “But of course saying this would put us into 
the problem of solipsism, because clearly noema is 
not merely subjective, it is also revealing of things 
that transcend consciousness” (B. D. R., 6). Ah, 
here is a rub! How is it revealing of the world if 
it is, after all, just appearance within consciousness 
and contact is never “substantial”? You said, "To 
perform phenomenology adequately, therefore, one 
must . . . attend to how the noema can inform us 
about the noetic acts of consciousness" (B. D. R., 
6). But what does the noema have to say about the 
external world, not just noetic acts? You said, “What 
transcends consciousness is not at issue as much as 
the structure of consciousness itself, in Husserlian 
phenomenology.” Ah, for Husserl, the world is less 
important. But then why did Giorgi (2009) go to 
pains to argue that there are essences in learning to 
ride a bicycle? 
You said, "The problem of language is tricky 
. . .  a medium by which consciousness does what 
it does in the process of disclosing a world" (B. D. 
R., 6). I’ll have to chew on this distinction between 
language as mediator v. medium. But language, it 
seems, would only be a medium in trying to know 
another who also uses language—for knowing a non-
languaging being, it seems it would be a cognitive 
tool or mediator. And, just as I am hampered in 
understanding Heidegger by not being fluent in 
German and missing his jokes, my language is quite 
a problem in terms of getting to any noetic acts of 
consciousness if it does not include these concepts. 
Perhaps I can only do phenomenology if I already 
know how to do phenomenology? Meanwhile, you 
never addressed my practical question directly: 
"How this approach could possibly bridge these 
dualities . . . through correlating noetic/noematic 
and approaching an understanding of Dasein . . . 
Is that possible and, if so, how?" (H. L. F., 5). Could 
you take this on?
The Importance of Being to Thought
B D R (7) 
It requires a certain degree of masochism 
to read Husserl and Heidegger. But also, yes, their 
work is tricky because there is a certain degree 
of circularity. But it is not a vicious circle—rather 
a hermeneutic one. I think of phenomenology as 
more like a Chinese finger trap. When one relaxes 
into the correct attitude, the cuff slips off with ease. 
Or it's like a fly in a bottle. The bottle keeps trying 
to go sideways and no matter which way he turns, 
he bounces off the glass. But all he has to do is 
go straight up and out the bottle he goes (thanks, 
Wittgenstein).
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In one sense, all of Western epistemology 
has been, in one form of another, a (failed) attempt 
to resolve Zeno's (not our co-author Z. F.) paradox. 
That's the fly bottle referred to above. Heidegger, I 
think, is pointing up and saying, "Hey, look up there 
at that hole." It sounds like tautology, but it's a way 
out of the traditional tautologies through entering 
the circularity in the right way, hermeneutically via 
phenomenology. 
Heidegger is not saying we are "pre-
ordained toward an object without exception" and 
in fact is saying quite the contrary. He's pointing out 
that our understanding of things is contingent and 
has changed with history and not in a good way. He 
thinks there is a special danger in our technological 
age—a danger of losing our ability to truly think 
what is most worthy of thought—the question 
of Being. For this reason, Heidegger (1954/1968) 
spends the last several lectures of his Was Heisst 
Denken? addressing a single fragment of text written 
by the pre-Socratic Greek thinker Parmenides. The 
fragment reads, "One should both say and think that 
Being is" (p. 168). Clearly, the fragment indicates an 
intimate connection between thinking and Being, a 
notion that carries over (not without some loss of 
clarity) into the thought of Plato and Aristotle.
In that same essay, Heidegger (1954/1968) 
refers to Socrates as "the purest thinker of the 
West" (p. 17) for his sense that thinking (if it is to be 
genuine thinking) is already directed towards order, 
goodness, beauty, truth and Being. In like manner, 
with Aristotle we find a thinking that understands 
the world as teleologically striving towards the 
ideal. Human beings as thinkers strive toward the 
excellence of the highest being by thinking about 
thinking. The Greeks thought that for human beings, 
thinking is most thought-worthy. But, in our age, 
what is most thought-provoking, says Heidegger, is 
that we are not thinking.
So, when Heidegger (1954/1968) wrote “in 
our thought-provoking time” (p. 6), he was referring 
not just to the current events of the day, but to our 
age as the epoch of the Gestell. In our time, we are 
still not thinking and, in this context, Heidegger 
refers to Nietzsche's (1883/2016) diagnosis of our 
age as a time of nihilism: “The wasteland grows.” If it 
is Being that most calls for thought, what most calls 
to be thought about in our age is the forgetting or 
withdrawal of Being and it is due to the withdrawal 
of Being that we are still not thinking. In contrast to 
Hegel's notion of history, Heidegger's is a history 
wherein we find ourselves increasingly fallen from 
and more distant from Being. Being withdraws in 
our technological age as the experience of thinking 
is reduced to calculative rationality. “Thinking” 
has become the experience of using rationality as 
a device to operate on a world of things already 
reified into a network of pre-defined ends—and so, 
ironically, is tautologous because it always finds what 
it has already calculated it will find in advance since 
that is what thinking has been reduced to. In our 
age, says Heidegger, ratio has trumped legein. The 
thoughtlessness of calculative rationality threatens 
to obliterate the possibility for being-thoughtful.
When Heidegger (1954/1968) wrote that 
“we are still not thinking” (p. 6) he meant that 
humans are not thinking upon that which is most 
thought-worthy, namely Being. He argued as 
well that humans shall continue to miss what is 
thought-worthy if they continue to use thinking 
as a technological device rather than thinking of 
thinking as thoughtful dwelling. Unless our thinking 
is rooted in the being-thoughtful of dwelling, then 
our thinking remains homeless. What it means to 
dwell as being-thoughtful Heidegger attempted to 
illuminate by tracing what was lost in translation 
when the Greek word for thinking, legein, was 
translated into the Latin, ratio. He found that two 
significations for legein are not found in ratio: a) 
thinking as speaking and b) thinking as gathering.
Thinking as speaking is a speaking and 
thinking which is attuned to how Being calls for 
thinking in language. The address or language 
of Being is historical, not historiological, in that it 
arises out of the sending of Being. So when legein is 
translated into ratio and when ratio, for instance, is 
taken up as Vernuft and Grund (Reason and Being?) 
in history, no human being made such decisions 
per se, but rather "language itself is speaking to us," 
(Caputo, 1986, p. 73). Philosophy and hence thinking 
have historically been translated into the language of 
"reason" which covers over the more fundamental 
sense of what serves as its primal source. In the 
Latin ratio, there is no obvious connection between 
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thinking and Being. Yet, when ratio is traced back 
to legein, from which Logos is derived, Heidegger 
(1957/1974) found that it means “to collect together,” 
“to lay one thing beside another,” and “to arrange 
one thing after another” (p. 178). Thus, one finds that 
second meaning of legein as a gathering.
Heidegger (1957/1974) wrote, “Legein and 
logos are the letting lie forward of a thing which 
comes to presence in its presence,” (p. 179). What 
for the Greek is that-which-comes-to-presence-in-its-
presence? It is the being in its Being; thus, "logos 
means Being" (p. 179). Thinking as gathering, then, 
is the gathering of Being. Heidegger (1959/1971a) 
wrote, “Thinking cuts furrows into the soil of Being” 
(p. 70). What calls for thinking then tells us what is 
called thinking: thinking is called a gathering for it 
gathers what is called to be gathered. What calls to 
be gathered? Being-thoughtful! 
Yes, of course, all of this sounds as though 
it is circular logic going nowhere, but with proper 
reflection one can see how Heidegger meditatively 
deepened what it means to think and in that sense 
performed the process of thinking. Heidegger 
showed how to think even as he showed how 
thinking is a showing, a presence or gathering of 
what calls to be thought. Heidegger demonstrated 
how being-thoughtful is not a matter of performing a 
method of mental activity that is applied to get from 
point A to point B. On the contrary, he showed how 
being-thoughtful is an encounter with Being.
As mentioned above, legein and logos are 
the "letting lie forward of the thing which comes to 
presence in the presence" (Heidegger, 1957/1974, 
p. 17). Regarding that which lies forward (das 
Verliegende), it is the upon-which that forms the 
basis for "properties" and the about-which that one 
may speak. In this sense, logos also means "ground." 
Hence, when one says logos in the Greek sense, 
one speaks in the same breath of Being and ground. 
Thus, Heraclitus said, "If you have heard not me, 
but the logos, then it is wise to say accordingly: 
all is one" (as cited in Caputo, 1986, p. 79). But 
this early Greek understanding of the belonging 
together of Being and ground becomes, in time, 
corrupted. Historically, the belonging together of 
Being and ground was forgotten. As Caputo (1986) 
explained:
Instead of being thought together with Being, 
ground becomes a determination of the being, 
and the search is undertaken to find the ground 
of one being in another. Thus, there is born 
the whole enterprise of "onto-theological," of 
"metaphysics," of philosophy itself as a rational 
inquiry into the cause of things. Things now must 
be founded upon the solid and firm foundation 
of a causal explanation. The self-evidence 
validity of this rational search for causes rests 
upon the now no longer heard ringing together 
of the unity of Being and ground in the Greek 
word logos. (p. 79; see also Goff, 1972)
In short, philosophy “as a thing of reason” is the 
consequence of the fall from the original early Greek 
sense that "the thing lies forth of itself, that it rises up 
and stands before us on its own grounds” (Caputo, 
1986, p. 79). Take Nietzsche, for example, whose 
will-to-power has its roots in this oblivion, by which 
the history of Western thought becomes an attempt 
to submit things to human reason for certifying its 
existence.
In contrast to the calculative reason that 
derives from the severance of Being from its grounds 
in Western thought, meditative thinking is a thinking 
that leaves metaphysics alone. It is a thinking that, 
instead, is called to think upon that which lies forth 
of itself without why—that is, without grounds. As 
Heidegger (1957/1974) wrote: "Insofar as Being it, it 
itself has no ground. Yet this is not so because it 
is self-grounded, but rather because every form of 
grounding, even and precisely that [which occurs] 
through itself, remains inappropriate to Being as 
ground" (p. 185).
Being, that is, cannot be explained upon 
grounds outside of itself. On the contrary to thinking, 
one must let Being be: let it lie forth (legein) and 
emerge of itself (physis).]
You said, “I’m not sure I buy this.” I am not 
sure what you are not buying. You say this in the 
context of the discussion of calculative reason's 
inability to think its own ground in Being. In response 
to the claim that the calculative rationalizing 
philosopher is thoughtless about what is most 
worthy of thought: Well, they are not thoughtful but 
in a specific sense—not in the sense of thinking that 
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Heidegger re-claimed from the Greeks. Philosophy 
is thoughtless in the sense that it is without legein. 
Here is a very revealing passage from Heidegger's 
(1977/1993) "The Origin of the Work of Art":
Occasionally, we still have the feeling that 
violence has long been done to the thingly 
[sic] element of things and that thought has 
played a part in this violence, for which reason 
people disavow thought instead of taking pains 
to make it more thoughtful. But in defining the 
essence of the thing, what is the use of a feeling, 
however certain, if thought alone has the right 
to speak here? Perhaps, however, what we call 
feeling or mood, here and in similar instances, 
is more reasonable—that is, more intelligently 
perceptive—because more open to Being 
than all that reason which, having meanwhile 
become ratio, was misinterpreted as being 
rational. The hankering after the irrational, as 
abortive offspring of the unthought rational, 
therewith performed a curious service. To be 
sure, the current thing-concept always fits each 
thing. Nevertheless, it does not lay hold of the 
thing as it is in its own being, but makes an 
assault upon it. (pp. 150-151)
 
H. L. F., you said: "Now if we are going to define 
essence in a non-platonic way, I will have to think 
about what it might mean. . . . in this Heideggerian 
fashion" (H. L. F., 6). In response to your questions 
about a non-Platonic essence, here Heidegger meant 
the condition of possibility for a phenomenon's 
givenness, or being. For example, the essence of 
truth is the revealing-concealing advent of Being. 
Dasein's essence is Being-in-the-world, etc. Sure 
we can talk about this in English. The point is that 
one learns phenomenology primarily by doing it. 
Until the language of phenomenology is put into 
practice, the words retain an essential obscurity, like 
any new vocabulary. In response to your question 
about consciousness, for Husserl there is no pure 
consciousness. Consciousness is, in its essence, 
directional, relational, about something. One can of 
course argue otherwise, although I think it would be 
a difficult case to make. 
What I mean when I say "radical" is that 
it gets to the roots or ground of something. The 
term radical is derived from the Latin, radix, “root.” 
Thinking about thinking is more radical than thinking 
about something other than thinking, because in 
the case of the former thinking is undergoing an 
inquiry into its own ground, or roots, or origins. But 
it is also "radical" in the sense that, per Heidegger, 
thinking does not typically think about its own 
grounds, Being. So, it is also radical in the sense 
of a dramatic change from the status quo – since if 
Heidegger is correct, thinking as legein and logos 
has been forgotten and Being, therefore, has been 
lost to thought. To reverse that trend of history is 
to engage in radical philosophy (or so Heidegger 
claims). 
You seem to treat consciousness as if it 
were a thing, in ways that are contrary to the 
phenomenological reduction of Husserl and the being-
in-the-world of Heidegger. Phenomenologically 
speaking—within the phenomenological reduction 
and when bracketing the natural attitude—the 
noetic pole of consciousness is not given directly 
in experience in the way biological processes are 
given. There is no way that one can discover noetic 
acts of consciousness by looking at someone's MRI, 
for example. It can only be discovered through the 
first-person experience of a conscious being and in 
that case it appears indirectly through the givenness 
of the world and the world-horizon within which 
the world is disclosed. Dasein is its disclosedness 
and (within the framework of phenomenology) 
this disclosedness cannot be reduced to biological 
processes because biological processes have their 
being by virtue of their givenness as they are 
disclosed through Dasein. 
Historically, there have been cultures in 
which the human soul and experience was thought 
to originate with the heart rather than the brain. This 
is another way to illustrate how the brain is not given 
as a noetic act of consciousness in the act of living 
out some experience. The brain is given as a source 
of consciousness only as a noematic content of 
consciousness. Otherwise, it would be self-evident 
that the brain is the source of experience and yet it 
is not given as such (see Robbins, 2013; Robbins & 
Gordon, 2014).
Likewise, when you said that “neuroscience” 
can get to “unconscious processes [that] occur much 
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quicker than consciousness can follow,” this is not 
something of great concern to phenomenology, as I 
understand it. The noetic pole of consciousness is not 
an objective datum, it is a condition of possibility for 
any “objective datum” to be what it is in its givenness 
as something that matters and is of concern enough 
to think and be concerned about. Phenomenology 
can appreciate that human beings are embodied 
and that human bodies have biological processes 
that can be discovered through a peculiar style of 
disclosing biological entities and processes, which 
we all know through our education. Phenomenology 
simply recognizes that these biological processes 
are not noetic acts of consciousness that can be 
discovered using the phenomenological method. 
Although, the noetic structure of consciousness as it 
is revealed through phenomenology is essential if we 
are to (a) have any science, including neuroscience, 
and (b) understanding the meaning of findings in 
neuroscience in ways that do not depend too heavily 
on the messy speculations of folk wisdom.
You stated with regard to my discussion of 
embarrassment that you were uncomfortable with 
the idea that an experience (i.e., embarrassment) 
might have a life-world. This was a way of saying that 
within a certain cultural context, and within certain 
conventions of the use of the term “embarrassment” 
as it is implicitly understood by naive reporters, 
embarrassment can be understood as the disclosure 
of a particular world of significance, with a structural 
regularity that can be seen across a wide variety of 
people. This is revealed not by explicit definitions 
given by participants, but is disclosed indirectly 
(noematically) in their descriptive narratives of 
personal experiences of embarrassment written from 
a first-person perspective. The phenomenologist, in 
examining this data, has the task of identifying the 
noetic structures that are revealed indirectly through 
these various narrative descriptions. Embarrassment, 
then, has both a noetic aspect (the acts of 
consciousness that make embarrassment possible) 
and a noematic aspect (a certain style by which the 
world is disclosed through these acts of consciousness 
we call embarrassment). Phenomenology need 
not assume singularity either (e.g., your suggestion 
that I was looking at embarrassment as a unitary 
structure); although in Giorgi's (2009) method the 
idea is to assimilate any singularities into a general 
structure that can accommodate all varieties of a 
phenomenon under one general category. This is 
not always possible or desirable. 
My point was simply to illustrate noesis and 
noema, using embarrassment as an example. What 
is new is the noema and noesis concepts, which are 
not there in developmental research nor dynamic 
theories of embarrassment. No one knows what an 
emotion or mood is, especially the developmental 
psychologists, and the psychodynamic theories 
are not much better off. Yes, they define emotions 
and moods, but they are superficial definitions 
and do not get at the roots of what an emotion 
is. Phenomenology has an answer to what they 
cannot explain. You wrote: “My claim for mediation 
here is not to claim causation, but only reciprocal 
relatedness—and this does not contradict these 
are inextricably inter-related, only they use more 
dualistic language” (H. L. F., 6). The term "mediator" 
suggests otherwise to me. I understand this term 
to mean a variable that is directly related to two 
variables that are also related to one another, but 
not directly. The mediator explains the relationship. 
For example, there is a positive relationship between 
sexually transmitted illness and phone sex. But these 
variables are not directly related; their relationship is 
mediated by a third variable: sexual motivation. 
In Husserlian phenomenology, we're not 
dealing with consciousness and its objects as 
“variables,” as if they are separate events that can 
be related. Rather, consciousness as an activity is 
revealed through that which is given to consciousness 
as a world, and even what is transcendent of 
consciousness is revealed as transcendent by an 
act of consciousness. This is not solipsism. Things 
are revealed as being other than consciousness by 
virtue of the way they are given to consciousness—
for example, as always given from a perspective and 
as always in the process of being revealed partially 
rather than completely within the world horizon, 
etc. 
You asked: “But noesis/noema are also 
dualistic, so what advantage is gained by their use?” 
They are not a classic duality, because noesis and 
noema are not separate events or entities. The acts 
of consciousness (noetic structures) are given to 
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consciousness indirectly through the manner in which 
these acts are revealed through the appearance of the 
world in its givenness (noematic structure). You also 
said, "I see one advantage, but it is not one I like . . . by 
denying the noema any ontological reality, there can 
be a consistent idealism . . . as it all can be held as inner 
or subjective" (H. L. F., 6). This is a misunderstanding. 
Noema and noesis cannot be reduced to subjectivity 
nor to objectivity. As I stated before, these terms do 
not map onto the subject-object duality. Let me try 
a different example. Let's take an ambiguous figure, 
such as the well-known duck-rabbit illusion image 
("Kaninchen und Ente", n.d.). 
When you see the rabbit, then the rabbit 
is the noematic content of consciousness. But this 
content is also revealed against a background—a 
horizon that recedes into the background as the 
image emerges into the foreground of perception. 
Then, I see the duck. Now, the duck is the noematic 
content of consciousness. Now I can switch back 
and forth. Duck, rabbit, duck, rabbit, etc. The act 
of switching between duck and rabbit is an act of 
consciousness—it is noetic. But as an aspect of the 
noesis, it is not directly given in the duck-rabbit 
display, but revealed in the way the duck-rabbit 
figure shows itself, through the switching back and 
forth at will from duck to rabbit and back again. 
The noesis is not some object over and 
against the duck-rabbit ambiguous figure. It is the 
acts by which the duck-rabbit image can appear 
as it does to awareness in the very way that it 
appears. The duck-rabbit is also revealed as having 
a transcendent being that is not reducible to “my 
consciousness,” because, for example, I cannot 
change its appearance at will beyond the two 
ambiguously held figures of duck and rabbit. I 
hold out for the possibility that it could be seen, 
potentially, in ways other than as a duck or rabbit. 
For example, when constituted as such, it can come 
to appear more like the map of a park seen from 
above, or a patch of wood behind a white wall's 
broken plaster. 
Conclusion
In this dialogue, B. D. R. and H. L. F. have attempted to elucidate phenomenology’s claims 
that it should be foundational to scientific investi-
gation and offers a phenomenological solution 
to the thorny problem of subject/object dualism 
plaguing transpersonal psychology and beyond. 
The interlocutors challenge each other and the 
readers to examine the fundamental concepts of 
phenomenology, such as noesis and noema, and 
their relevance to transpersonal psychology and 
science as a whole. B. D. R. proposes and defends 
the proposition that phenomenology is foundational 
to science and knowing. Phenomenology provides 
a means to describe and understand the implicit 
assumptions and parameters of any field of study 
or way of knowing. That is, it provides a means 
to radically interrogate the essential meaning of a 
thing by making its assumptions and framework 
explicit. Without clarifying these, any truth 
endeavor, whether in physics or psychology, may 
be limited and misled by faulty preconceptions 
and unexamined assumptions thus challenging the 
validity and quality of its knowledge. B.D.R. argues 
that phenomenology provides an approach for 
seeking the essential meaning structures of science 
and any of its subfields such as physics, psychology, 
and the transpersonal. Moreover, phenomenology 
seeks a solid grasp of what the object or experience 
under investigation truly is and truly means. That 
is, what makes it this certain type of thing and not 
another thing? What are the essential elements and 
attributes of this phenomenon? For the transpersonal 
psychologists, what distinguishes the transpersonal 
(or the spiritual, transcendent, etc.) from some other 
type of experience? Phenomenology provides the 
researcher with tools to describe and understand 
the limitations, extent, and meaning of phenomena 
such as altered states of consciousness, near-death 
experiences, and the like. This in-depth critical 
analysis is how phenomenology is foundational to 
scientific endeavor and is what so often gets ignored 
or dismissed in the pursuit of knowledge.  
B. D. R. also addresses several common 
misconceptions of phenomenology such as the 
idea that phenomenology is the study of subjective 
experiences. He also attempts to clarify Heidegger’s 
proposition that phenomenology is a unique 
and important type of thinking—an approach 
that precedes calculative or rational thinking by 
illuminating what is worthy of contemplation. H. L. 
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F. provides an important and useful inquiry that helps 
elucidate these significant and often misunderstood 
qualities of phenomenology. In the end, he holds to 
his skepticism about this solution.
In sum, this dialogue has explored how some 
of the basic concepts of phenomenology might 
provide an important foundation to scientific studies 
and indeed to all knowing in human experience, 
including transpersonal studies. This dialogue also 
highlights how phenomenology offers a solution 
to the subject/object dualism that transpersonal 
investigators often find vexing but difficult to 
surmount. B. D. R. provides important clarifications 
and explications regarding phenomenology’s 
potential import and contributions to science. H. L. F. 
provides an important counterpoint and skepticism 
that carries the dialogue forward and encourages 
these significant insights to surface. 
How successful B. D. R. and H. L. F. have 
been at clarifying these concepts is up to the reader 
to decide but, if nothing else, this protracted debate 
illustrates an adversarial collaboration which serves 
as a bridge between differing worldviews (Tannen, 
2002), relating to one meaning of the prefix “trans” 
in transpersonal—that is, bridging. For transpersonal 
psychologists, phenomenology provides a tool and a 
challenge. It supplies a tool for radically investigating 
the qualities that make the field "transpersonal" to 
begin with as well as for closely describing the essential 
features of the transpersonal objects and experiences 
under investigation. It also challenges transpersonal 
psychologists to closely examine and make explicit 
the assumptions inherent in the noetic/noema life-
world of the researcher, participants, and beyond. 
Notes
1.   Parts of this discussion have been previously 
published in Robbins (2014).
2.   Correspondence concerning this article 
should be addressed to Harris L. Friedman 
at harrisfriedman@hotmail.com. This paper 
was developed from the transcripts of email 
correspondence between several regular 
contributors to the Society for Humanistic 
Psychology (American Psychological 
Association [APA], Division 32) listserv. Several 
other individuals contributed to the overall 
dialogue; however, for clarity and brevity, the 
dialogue as presented here has been edited, 
as well as limited to the contributions of the 
authors. In addition, because these quotes are 
from transcripts of an interactive conversation, 
some of the usual expectations in APA writing 
style may seem to not be consistently met; 
however, exceptions are allowed with quotes to 
retain the integrity of the source.
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